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Abstract 
Using nationally representative workplace surveys we examine the relationship between unionization 
and workplace financial performance in Britain and France. We find that union bargaining is 
detrimental to workplace performance in Britain and that this effect is larger when unionization is 
endogenized. In France, union bargaining is associated with poorer workplace performance but the 
effect disappears once unionization is treated as endogenous.  However, high levels of union density 
do have a negative impact on workplace performance in France. In Britain the union effect does not 
rise with union density. 
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ISBN 978-0-85328-373-7 1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
In theory, unions have countervailing influences on firm performance. If they are successful 
in bargaining for above-market wages or in capturing quasi-rents (for example, through 
restrictive practices that reduce labour productivity) unions will reduce firm profitability, 
other things equal. On the other hand unions can enhance firm performance through voice 
effects which can raise labour productivity and improve managerial decision-making 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984), or by acting as an agent for the employer in monitoring 
workers, or in assisting with organizational change (Vroman, 1990). The empirical literature 
indicates that the negative effects prevail. However, this evidence is almost exclusively 
Anglo-American (Metcalf, 2003). It is unclear whether this empirical regularity extends to 
other countries. This paper addresses this issue by investigating union effects in Britain and 
France using comparable workplace-level data. 
 
Britain and France are advanced industrialised West European economies of comparable 
scale.  However, their employment relations systems vary in ways that imply rather different 
union effects on firm profitability.  Private sector union density is around three times higher 
in Britain than it is in France.  But the hurdles that employees have to jump in order to trigger 
union representation at the workplace and workplace-level collective bargaining are much 
lower in France than they are in Britain. In France, a worker simply needs endorsement from 
the national union in order to serve as a lay union representative in her workplace.   
Employers are legally obliged to negotiate in good faith with such representatives, 
irrespective of whether there are other union members on-site, and the resulting agreements 
apply to all workers. Organization-level or workplace-level bargaining often take place 
alongside sectoral or national bargaining which is very widespread. As a consequence, the 
vast majority of French workers have their pay set via collective bargaining, whether or not 
they are union members. In contrast, it is difficult for British workers to achieve collective 
bargaining coverage, even if a union has support among the workforce, since the extent of 
involvement and degree of influence of the union is more heavily determined by the 
employer. A statutory procedure giving bargaining rights to workers where a majority of 
workers want them has rarely been called upon since it was introduced in 1999. 
 
These institutional differences imply different union effects on firm performance in Britain 
and France. We address this issue by conducting directly comparable analyses of the 
associations between unions and workplace performance in Britain and France using data 
from two equivalent surveys conducted in 2004: the British Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS) and the French Relations Professionnelles et Négociations 
d’Entreprises (REPONSE). We undertake directly comparable analyses to draw inferences 
about the role of unions in the differing institutional contexts.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes employment relations 
in Britain and France, pointing to the institutional differences as they relate to unionisation.  
Section 3 outlines the theory linking unions to performance, and hypothesises about the 
different effects unions will have in Britain and France. Section 4 presents the data and 
estimation approach.  Section 5 presents results and Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2.  UNIONISATION IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE  
 
Britain has a largely voluntarist system of workplace union representation and collective 
bargaining. Although the 1999 Employment Relations Act introduced a statutory union   2
recognition procedure, granting negotiating rights to unions in firms where they had majority 
worker support, the procedure is intended as a last resort and has rarely been invoked (Gall, 
2004; Kersley et al, 2006). In practice, there are thus no requirements for employers to 
recognise unions for the purpose of collective bargaining and no stipulations over the scope 
of bargaining. Instead, the degree of employee support for workplace union representation is 
key. Over the last two decades there has been a reduction in the extent of union involvement 
in workplace regulation (Millward et al, 2000).  Although governments have been more 
supportive of their role in the last decade, employee perceptions of union effectiveness have 
remained unchanged (Bryson, 2007a). Union membership density and union recognition for 
collective bargaining have both fallen by around a half since the mid-1980s, with just 16 per 
cent of private sector employees now belonging to unions and 20 per cent having their pay set 
by a collective agreement (Mercer and Notley, 2008). Unions are typically involved in 
workplace regulation only where traditions remain sufficiently strong among employees and 
market conditions facing the employer remain sufficiently benign. Even then, the scope of 
bargaining tends to be limited to core terms and conditions, such as pay, hours and holidays.  
Few industries retain national or sectoral pay bargaining so that, where bargaining occurs, it 
typically takes place at organisation or workplace level (Kersley et al., 2006).  
 
The institutional setting in France is quite different. Union density has been decreasing 
among private sector employees in France for decades and currently stands at around 5 per 
cent. Yet sectoral-level national bargaining is common.  Furthermore, provided the firm has 
at least 50 employees, French legislation allows any of the five national union confederations 
(CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC and CGC) to designate a representative at workplace or 
company-level with whom the employer must negotiate once a year over specific terms and 
conditions including pay, working time, pensions and training. (In firms with fewer than 50 
employees only elected worker representatives can serve as union delegates but, subject to 
this restriction, they have the same rights to bargain with the employer). Any collective 
agreement that results from these negotiations automatically applies to all employees in the 
firm, even if very few employees belong to or support the union. Until 2004, this workplace 
union representative did not require the support of the establishment’s workforce in order to 
take up the role.  The Loi Fillon passed in 4th May 2004 replaced this rule of ‘presumed 
representativeness’ with another stating that agreements can henceforth be signed only with 
unions representing a majority of employees in the firm.  
 
There are three consequences arising from these differing legislative frameworks. First, 
workplace- or organization-level collective bargaining is much more common in France than 
in Britain: this seems to be the case whether the workplace is covered by the legislation or 
not. Thus in 2004, 52% of French private sector workplaces with 20 or more employees had 
workplace or organization-level collective bargaining, compared to 9% in Britain. Among 
private sector workplaces in organizations with 50 or more employees the figures were 73% 
for France and 17% for Britain. Second – at least until the passing of the Loi Fillon – French 
unions could obtain negotiating rights at workplace or organisation level even in the absence 
of widespread union membership among the workforce. In 2004, union density was below 20 
per cent in over four-fifths (86 per cent) of French workplaces with 20 or more employees in 
which unions had negotiating rights. In Britain, on the other hand, union density was below 
20 per cent in only one quarter (27 per cent) of workplaces with recognised unions. Third, 
despite the low level of union density in France, more than 90 per cent of employees are 
covered by national or company-level agreements – over four times higher than in Britain. 
Coverage often entails coverage by both a national bargaining agreement and a workplace or   3
organisation level agreement, something that is uncommon in Britain (Brown et al, 2008) but 
often occurs in Continental Europe (Bryson, 2007b). 
 
 
3.  THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON UNIONS’ EFFECTS ON FIRM PROFITABILITY 
 
One of the most well established effects of unions is their ability to increase wages above 
competitive levels (Lewis, 1986; Booth, 1995). Other things equal, this will have a 
detrimental impact on firm profits unless the firm is able to pass on the cost increase to 
customers in the form of higher prices. The size of the union’s impact on financial 
performance depends on the scale of potential rents, which is related to the market structure 
facing the firm, and also on the bargaining power of the union. Rent-sharing with unions 
appears most likely where firms have surplus rents, as may occur where the product market is 
less competitive, and where unions have substantial bargaining power due to their ability to 
mobilize workers in pursuit of wage grievances (Hirsch and Addison, 1986). Unions may 
indirectly reduce profitability if their rent-extraction reduces shareholders’ desire to invest in 
new capital (Grout, 1984). 
 
Unions may also have a positive impact on firm performance. Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) 
collective voice and institutional response model draws on the exit-voice dichotomy of 
Hirschman (1970). In a workplace context ‘voluntary quits become the labor market 
expression of exit and unions become the institution for the expression of (collective) voice’ 
(Turnbull, 1991: 137). By providing workers with a means of expressing discontent at the 
workplace, unions can reduce quits and absenteeism; this may benefit the workplace since 
high labour turnover can reduce productivity through a direct loss of firm-specific training 
(Addison and Barnett, 1982). Unions can also enhance productivity by improving 
communication between workers and management (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The 
opening of communication channels between management and workers can result in 
integrative rather than distributive bargaining. Unions may provide additional information to 
a firm about the preferences of employees, thus permitting the firm to choose a better mix 
among working conditions, workplace rules and wage levels. These can result in a more 
satisfied, cooperative and productive workforce. In addition, unions may be responsible for a 
‘shock effect’ whereby unions induce managers to alter methods of production and adopt 
more efficient personnel policies.  
 
Theoretical predictions about union effects on firm performance are thus ambiguous. 
However, empirical evidence points to a negative effect of unions on profitability (Addison 
and Hirsch, 1989; Metcalf, 2003; Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2009). This arises because, in 
general, unions are successful in extracting a union wage premium whereas their effects on 
productivity tend to be zero or negative (Hirsch, 2003). There are some important caveats to 
these empirical findings, however. First, union effects differ over time. For example, 
Blanchflower and Bryson (2008) find unions’ negative effects on firm financial performance 
diminished over the last quarter century. Second, the evidence is almost exclusively Anglo-
American. It is unclear whether this empirical regularity extends to other countries. The only 
study for France, for instance, finds no association between union presence and firm financial 
performance even in establishments facing few or no competitors in their main product 
market (Laroche, 2004). It is unclear whether one can extrapolate from this single study.   4
However, other recent comparative studies of union effects point to the importance of the 
institutional environment in explaining differences in union effects across countries.
1 
 
How might we expect the institutional differences to influence union effects on firm 
profitability in Britain and France?  
 
Our first hypothesis is that union bargaining will be detrimental to workplace performance in 
both Britain and France since employers in both countries are restricted to some degree in 
their ability to resist unionisation and thus protect profits. In France, the restriction is 
primarily legislative in origin; in Britain it derives from a union being able to demonstrate 
substantial support among the workforce.  
 
Our second hypothesis is that any negative effect of union bargaining on performance may be 
more apparent in Britain than in France. There are two justifications for this hypothesis. First, 
the costs of organizing are greater in Britain than they are in France. This implies that the 
incentive needed to encourage employees to shoulder these costs needs to be greater in 
Britain than in France. One might therefore expect to observe a larger union wage premium 
in Britain, an expectation confirmed by Blanchflower and Bryson (2003). Assuming no 
substantial union-induced productivity differential across the two countries this larger union 
wage premium in Britain should translate into a greater negative impact on performance in 
Britain compared with France. Second, since national and sectoral bargaining are so 
widespread in France few firms are untouched by union pay bargaining, even if they have no 
on-site union. Consequently, collectively bargained outcomes are liable to affect most French 
firms similarly. Britain, on the other hand, has fragmented bargaining and low bargaining 
coverage so that many firms will be untouched by union bargaining.  Union firms must thus 
compete with a number of domestic competitors who do not face the higher labour costs that 
unions bring, resulting in a competitive disadvantage which will affect their profitability.   
 
Thirdly, we hypothesise that any performance penalty associated with union presence in 
either country will vary according to the level of workplace union density, but that this effect 
will be stronger in Britain since union membership can be expected to be more salient in 
determining union bargaining power within British workplaces. In France union 
representatives can engage in pay bargaining at workplace level without substantial worker 
support for the union. Legal rights to bargain mean French unions do not have to rely solely 
on worker support to retain some bargaining power.  In Britain, on the other hand, unions’ 
bargaining strength is enhanced by the percentage of all workers they represent and leads to a 
higher union wage premium (Stewart, 1987; Forth and Millward, 2002).
2  If union bargaining 
strength is more dependent on union density in Britain than in France, one might also expect 
it to have a stronger link to firms’ profitability in Britain.   
 
 
4.  DATA AND METHODS 
 
The data used are derived from the REPONSE Survey, a nationally representative survey of 
all private sector workplaces in France with 20 or more employees, and the Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS), a nationally representative survey of all workplaces 
                                                           
1 For example, see Bryson and Dale-Olsen’s (2008) study of union effects on employment growth and 
workplace survival in Britain and Norway. 
2 The same is true for other countries with fragmented workplace-level bargaining such as the United States 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1981; Lewis, 1986; Schumacher, 1999).   5
in Britain with 5 or more employees. For comparability with the REPONSE sample, we 
restrict our attention to those private sector workplaces in WERS with 20 or more employees. 
The two surveys employed similar methodologies and both collected information, through 
face-to-face interviews, with the senior manager at the workplace with responsibility for 
personnel issues. These interviews collected comparable data on many establishment 
characteristics, the employment practices in place at the establishment and the environment in 
which the establishment was operating, thereby enabling us to compile equivalently-specified 
models in both countries. The surveys also gathered objective and attitudinal data on union 
presence and perceptual indicators of workplace performance. For some measures, such as 
workplace performance, respondents were asked to provide their perceptions on Likert-type 
scales. For other measures, such as establishment size, informants provided factual data.  
 
Our unit of analysis is the establishment. Objective financial measures of performance are 
typically only available at firm-level and, although establishment-specific data was collected 
among a subset of the WERS participants (see Forth and McNabb, 2008), such data are 
available only for those workplaces in REPONSE that equate to single-site firms. 
Accordingly, we rely primarily on the qualitative assessment of workplace performance that 
is provided by most participants in either survey. While the use of perceptual measures of 
performance is open to criticism, such measures are often the only ones available at the 
establishment level and have been used in a large number of other studies (e.g. Machin and 
Stewart 1990, 1996; Blanchflower and Bryson, 2008), as well as in other countries such as 
the United States (Voos, 1987) and Australia (Drago and Wooden, 1992). Cooke (1992) has 
argued that the use of perceptual measures permits comparison across establishments in a 
variety of industries and that informed managers should be able to provide reasonable 
approximations of workplace performance within a restricted response range. In addition, 
past evaluations of the subjective ratings in WERS have shown that managers’ ratings are 
correlated with the subsequent probability of workplace closure (Machin and Stewart, 1990, 
1996). Furthermore, Forth and McNabb (2008) have recently shown that the measure of 
perceived workplace profitability in WERS correlates positively with an objective measure of 
workplace profitability. They also demonstrate that simple regression analyses conducted on 
either measure lead to broadly equivalent conclusions about the impact of unions. We report 
similar findings for Britain below when we check the sensitivity of our results to the use of 
accounting measures of profitability. 
 
The dependent variable for the REPONSE analysis was constructed from one item assessing 
respondents’ perceptions of their workplace’s profitability relative to their competitors. The 
equivalent item in WERS uses the more general term ‘financial performance’ and invites a 
comparison with ‘other establishments in the same industry’.
3 In both surveys responses are 
coded on a five point ordinal scale ranging from ‘a lot better than average’ to ‘a lot below 
average’. Table 1 presents the distribution across the relative performance categories in each 
country. The principal difference between the two countries is that managers in British 
workplaces tend to have a uniformly more positive view of their performance, with the 
overall distribution of responses shifting to the right in Figure 1 when compared with the 
distribution of responses from REPONSE. Managers in Britain seem to be more reluctant 
than managers in France to rate the performance of their workplace as ‘below average’. 
However, there is no reason to suspect that the cross-country differential in managers’ 
                                                           
3 Managers are subsequently asked in WERS what measure of ‘financial performance’ they use, and many cite 
profitability (others cite the share price, productivity and so on). We do not restrict the GB analysis presented in 
the paper to the sub-sample citing profitability as the smaller sample results in estimates with reduced precision, 
but the nature of the associations remains the same.    6
perceptions of their workplace’s performance will affect within-country estimates of union 
effects on that performance. 
 
TABLE 1 
 Workplace Financial Performance by Country 






 Better than 
average 




GB  0.4% 5.9%  33.1%  47.4%  13.2%  863 
France  2.3% 14.5%  52.9%  28.2%  2.2%  1,788 
 
 
To test the relationship between unionization and performance we constructed a range of 
unionization measures which are roughly comparable across the two countries. Our first 
measure concerns the extent of union negotiating rights at the workplace. In Britain the 
primary indicator is the presence of a recognition agreement, whether at workplace or 
organization-level, which permits one or more unions to bargain over terms and conditions 
for employees at the surveyed workplace..  In France, the primary indicator of negotiating 
rights is the presence of a union delegate (délégué syndical) either at workplace or 
organization-level.  Second, in recognition of evidence indicating that some recognition 
agreements – in Britain at least – may be little more than ‘hollow shells’ (e.g. Kersley, 2006), 
we distinguish between workplaces where unions are actively engaged in pay bargaining and 
those where they have negotiation rights but are not actively engaged in collective bargaining 
(in other words, their bargaining rights are not being exercised). In Britain, the resulting 
three-category variable identifies: (i) workplaces with no union recognized for pay 
bargaining; (ii) workplaces where unions are recognized but no bargaining takes place; and 
(iii) those where there is active bargaining over wages. Our measure for France is very 
similar, but in the case of multi-site organizations the data do not allow us to distinguish 
between workplaces where bargaining rights are exercised and those where the bargaining 
rights are not exercised. Thus we use a five-category variable which identifies three scenarios 
for single-establishment organizations and two for multi-site organizations.  In the case of 
single-site organizations we distinguish between those that have no union delegate, those 
with a union delegate but where the employer reports no active bargaining, and those with a 
union delegate and active collective bargaining.  In the case of multi-site organizations we 
distinguish between workplaces with and without collective bargaining rights. Third, we 





























employ a measure of union density at the workplace. This is computed as the proportion of 
all employees that belong to a trade union and, in Britain at least, can be considered a proxy 
for union strength. Fourth, we distinguish between different named unions since, in France, 
there are substantial differences across unions in their traditions of militancy and in their 
ability to procure a wage premium (Breda, 2008).  
 
Table 2 shows the bivariate associations between the union measures and workplace financial 
performance. In Britain, performance is poorest among workplaces with active collective 
bargaining over wages and the association does not differ with high union density. In France, 
performance is slightly worse where unions have bargaining rights but it is poorest of all 
where those bargaining rights are exercised.  In addition, workplaces with high union density 
are less likely than other workplaces to be high performers. Comparing different unions, 
performance is lowest in France where the revolutionary SUD is present. In Britain, it is 
lowest where the general GMB union is present.  
 
TABLE 2 
Proportion of workplaces with ‘above average’ financial performance 
 in Britain and France 
  France GB 
 Propn.  High 
performers
1 




All Workplaces  0.30   1,788  0.61   863 
Collective bargaining rights           
No union(s) with collective bargaining rights  0.32  0.48  423  0.61  0.80  529 
Union(s) present with collective bargaining rights  0.29  0.52  1,359  0.59  0.20  334 
Collective bargaining activity (France) 
Single-site organization, no bargaining rights 
Single-site organization, bargaining rights not exercised 
Single-site organization, bargaining rights exercised 
Multi-site organization, no bargaining rights 





































Collective bargaining activity (GB)           
No union(s) with bargaining rights  - -  -  0.61  0.80  529 
Bargaining rights present but not exercised  - -  -  0.67  0.07  73 
Collective bargaining taking place  - -  -  0.54  0.13  261 
Union density            
None (GB) / 0-5% (Fr)  0.32  0.61  705  0.63  0.71  426 
1-19% (GB) / 5-19% (Fr)  0.30  0.23  683  0.53  0.11  141 
20%+ 0.19  0.07  196  0.54  0.17  282 
Missing 0.24  0.09  191  0.73  0.01  14 
Identity of recognised union (France)           
CFDT (reformist)  0.31  0.32  1,023       
CGT (communist)  0.29  0.32  1,045       
CFTC (reformist)  0.31  0.19  655       
CGT-FO (Communist/Trotskyist : reformist) 0.32  0.27  869       
CGC (white collar executives)  0.30  0.18  746       
SUD (revolutionary)  0.22  0.02  89       
UNSA (reformist)  0.25  0.03  113       
Other unions  0.35  0.06  156       
No bargaining rights  0.32  0.48  423       
Identity of recognised union (GB)           
TGWU (general)        0.54  0.03  56 
UNIFI (finance)        0.88  0.01  12 
USDAW (retail)        0.54  0.02  28 
Amicus (general)        0.57  0.01  42 
GMB (general)        0.40  0.02  28 
Other unions        0.56  0.05  95 
No active bargaining        0.62  0.87  602 
1. High performers are those where respondent says the workplace financial performance was ‘better than 
average’ or ‘a lot better than average’. 
 
To establish the independent association between unions and performance we turn to 
regression estimates which control for variables which may be correlated with performance   8
and unionization. To account for the influence of size of the workplace and scale effects we 
included several dichotomous variables to indicate the number of employees in the 
workplace. A number of additional variables entered the estimates to control for the broader 
nature of employment practice at the establishment. These included controls for the presence 
of management practices such as performance-related pay, quality circles and briefing 
groups, controls for team working and job autonomy, and controls for the use of temporary 
contracts. We also control for the recent introduction of new technology. The full set of 
controls is presented in Table A1.  
 
We also incorporate variables capturing the nature and state of the product market. These 
include direct measures of the market share for the main product or service of the workplace, 
the geographical location of the market – local, regional, national or international - and 
whether the current state of the market for the main product or service is growing, mature, or 
declining (see Appendix Table A1 for details). Finally, we include dummy variables 
representing industries to capture any other industry characteristics associated with 
performance perceptions. 
 
Since the workplace financial performance variable is an ordinal categorical variable, we use 
ordered probit models to estimate performance, an approach which is standard in the 
literature (eg. Blanchflower and Bryson, 2008; Machin and Stewart, 1996; Drago and 
Wooden, 1992). Because sample sizes are very small in the lower tail of the distribution we 
recode the 5-way variables into four categories, namely workplaces with financial 
performance that is ‘a lot better’ than average, ‘better than average’, ‘average’, and ‘below/a 
lot below’ average.  
 
We thus assume that the financial performance of workplace i (i=1,…,N) is summarised by a 
continuous latent variable FPi* which is a linear function of workplace attributes represented 
by the column vector Xi, a variable Ui capturing unionization which, depending on the model 
specification, may be either a dummy or a series of dummies representing a categorical 
variable, and an error term εi distributed as standard normal: 
 
FPi∗=Xi’β+δUι+ει  (1) 
 
where β is a vector of coefficients associated with workplace attributes and δ is the scalar 
coefficient associated with unionisation. The set of controls included in Xi refers to the 
workplace controls noted above. FP*i is not observed; rather, in the data we observe FPi, its 
discrete realisation, which takes  a set of ordered values as FP*i crosses the latent cut-off 
points  τ1..τ4. Significant positive coefficients indicate variables associated with better 
financial performance. We adjust the estimator to account for differential sampling 
probabilities across establishments by applying sampling weights, and also use a robust 
variance estimator. 
 
One potential concern is that unionization may be endogenous with respect to workplace 
performance, leading to biased estimates. Brown et al. (2008) show that the pace of union 
decline in Britain is slowest among workplaces with the highest profits, suggesting unions are 
focusing their energies on organizing highly profitable workplaces. If this is unaccounted for 
by controls in our models this will induce an upward bias in any positive estimates of 
collective bargaining effects on workplace performance in Britain.  In France, on the other 
hand, the legal setting is such that the costs to the union of obtaining collective bargaining 
rights are close to zero, which means we would not expect to see the sort of positive selection   9
effect one might expect for Britain.  Instead, since around nine-in-ten private sector 
employees in France are already covered by national-level collective pay bargaining, it seems 
likely that French workers will trigger their rights to workplace- or organization-level 
bargaining when other concerns are prominent, such as job insecurity or where they have 
grievances against their employer.  Since such concerns are likely to be more common among 
workpaces with low levels of profitability, this will induce a downward bias in any positive 
estimates of collective bargaining effects on workplace performance in France if it is 
unaccounted for. Different considerations come into play in relation to the selection processes 
underlying union density since this is largely a function of individual workers’ assessments of 
the costs and benefits of union membership.  In Britain and France these are likely to turn on 
the union’s ability to extract rents from the employer through the deployment of greater 
bargaining power at the workplace (Schnabel, 2003).  Thus in both countries union density is 
likely to be correlated with high-rent firms which, if unaccounted for in our models, will 
upwardly bias the effects of union density on workplace performance. 
 
To overcome these selection issues we estimate the effect of unionization on financial 
performance while simultaneously modelling the union status of workplaces. In this way we 
are able to control for the presence of unobserved correlation between unionization and 
performance, thus eliminating the bias induced by unobserved heterogeneity and delivering 
the causal impact of unionization.  
 
We augment equation (1) with a probit equation for the probability of active collective 
bargaining: 
 
U*i=Zi’γ+Wi’θ+ui  (2) 
 
where  U*i is a continuous latent propensity underlying the dummy Ui,  Zi is a vector of 
observables, γ is the vector of coefficients associated with those observables, Wi is a variable 
(or variables) that have no effect on performance after unionisation has been controlled for, θ  
is the coefficient for this variable, and ui is an error term distributed as standard normal. We 
model the link between ui and εi by allowing them to be distributed as bivariate normal with 
unrestricted correlation ρ≡corr(εi ui). By simultaneously estimating equations (1) and (2) we 
are able to separately identify the correlation between unobservables – the coefficient ρ – and 
thus to remove the bias induced by unobserved heterogeneity from the coefficient δ in (1).  
 
The set of attributes in Zi is identical to those in Xi. In the British case the ‘instruments’ Wi for 
union bargaining activity are (i) a dummy variable identifying workplaces in existence for 10 
years or more (to capture the well-known cohort effect in Britain (see, for example, Millward 
et al, 2000; Machin 2000)) and (ii) a dummy identifying workplaces located in the North 
East, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, Scotland or Wales (areas where the propensity 
to unionise has traditionally been, and remains, strongest (see Mercer and Notley, 2008)). 
The instruments for union density are (i) the region identifier just noted, (ii) a dummy 
identifying workplaces where women account for more than 50% of employees (since in 
Britain women now have a greater propensity than men to join unions (Mercer and Notley, 
2008); and (iii) a dummy identifying workplaces with any workers aged 16-17 (since younger 
workers have a lower propensity to join unions (Machin, 2000; Mercer and Notley, 2008)). In 
France the instrument for union bargaining is a dummy identifying organizations with fewer 
than 50 employees, this being the size cut-off above which organizations are subject to the 
law governing worker bargaining rights. The instruments for union density are (i) a dummy 
identifying workplaces in which more than 10% of workers are young women and (ii) a   10
dummy identifying workplaces with male craftsmen present. The identifying assumption in 
all cases is that these instrumental variables capture differences in the net benefits (to either 
workplaces or individuals) of union organizing but, having conditioned on the other variables 
in the model, they have no direct bearing on workplace performance.  
 
 
5.  RESULTS 
 
Table 3 presents model specifications for Britain (columns 1-3) and France (columns 4-6) 
respectively.
4 The first model specification (columns 1 and 4) is the collective bargaining 
variable with no controls. The second (columns 2 and 5) introduces controls for structural 
features of the workplace, workforce composition, and product market characteristics. The 
third specification (columns 3 and 6) introduces human resource management (HRM) 
practices.
5  Model 1 shows the association between workplace financial performance and the 
simple presence of unions with bargaining rights.  Model 2 distinguishes between workplaces 
with active collective bargaining and those with union bargaining rights but no active 
bargaining. In the British case unionized workplaces are associated with poorer financial 
performance than non-unionized workplaces, but only where unions are actively engaged in 
collective bargaining (Model 2). The effect is robust to the introduction of controls and 
strengthens having accounted for HRM practices. The marginal effect of active collective 
bargaining is quite sizeable: relative to no union recognition, having a union actively engaged 
in collective bargaining reduces the probability of having financial performance ‘a lot better 
than average’ for the industry by 5 percent. 
                                                           
4 Other variables in the model also perform in a way that one might have anticipated: for example, workplaces 
with growing product markets perform significantly better than workplaces with declining, turbulent or mature 
product markets. See Table A2.  
5 Although HRM practices may be endogenous with respect to unionization and workplace performance we 
introduce them to estimate the sensitivity of union effects to their inclusion.   11
 
TABLE 3 
Union effects on financial performance by country 
  GB GB GB  France  France  France 
Model 1: Collective 
bargaining rights (ref. no 













Model  2 Collective 
bargaining activity (Britain): 
 (ref. no recognition) 
      
Recognition of union but no 
bargaining   0.195 0.011 0.043       
Collective bargaining   -0.175  -0.335**  -0.378**       
Model 2 Collective 
bargaining activity (France): 
 (ref. single, no bargaining 
rights) 
   
   
Single, bargaining rights not  
exercised      -0.146  -0.061  -0.193 
Single, bargaining rights 
exercised       -0.260**  -0.208  -0.236* 
Multi, no bargaining rights        0.001  -0.067  -0.097 
Multi, bargaining rights        -0.121  -0.202*  -0.263** 
Workplace  structure   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Workforce  composition   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Product  market   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HRM  practices     Yes    Yes 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
Full specifications for Model 2 are given in Appendix Table A2. Other specifications are available 
from the authors. 
 
In the French case, the presence of unions with bargaining rights alone is associated with 
poorer financial performance (Model 1).
6 As noted above, we can only test the importance of 
active collective bargaining in single independent establishments but, among this group of 
workplaces, only those with active bargaining have poorer performance than workplaces 
without unions (Model 2). That said, the coefficient is not significantly different from single-
establishment organizations where unions have bargaining rights but do not exercise them.  
 
The association between unionization and performance presented in Table 3 may be biased 
by unobserved features of the workplace that affect both union presence and workplace 
performance. In Britain for example, as noted earlier, unions’ ability to organize workplaces 
with higher profits may downwardly bias unions’ negative effects on performance (making 
them appear less negative than they really are). To allow for this in our analyses of union 
effects in Britain, we ran an IV regression of Model 2 in column 3 using the instruments 
noted in Section Four.  The collective bargaining variable was collapsed into a dummy 
variable capturing active collective bargaining.
7  The results in Table 4 show that collective 
                                                           
6 We note at this point that we do not compare the magnitude of the union effects across countries because the 
coefficients in the ordered probit model are inherently standardized; if the error variances differ across the two 
countries, the standardization will also differ, invalidating any comparisons. Williams (2008) has proposed the 
use of heterogeneous choice models as a solution in the presence of between-group differences in error 
variances. However, it is necessary to assume that the cutpoints are the same for both groups - an assumption 
that does not appear valid in our data (see Figure 1).  
7 We focus on active collective bargaining, where the association appears strongest. It is also the case that the 
program we use to perform the IV ordered probit regressions permits only a single endogenous variable. As 
anticipated, workplaces aged 10 years or more and those located in the north of Britain were more likely to have   12
bargaining is endogenous in Britain such that treating it as exogenous understates the 




Test for Endogeneity of Collective Bargaining 
 
  GB GB  France    France 
      
Active collective bargaining 
(ref no active bargaining)  -0.384** -1.163***    
Collective bargaining rights  
(ref no bargaining rights)     -0.221*** 0.062 










Rho   0.514**  -0.200 
 
For France we ran IV estimates of collective bargaining using the specification for Model 1 
shown in column 3 of Table 3, where the unionization variable indicates the presence of a 
délégué syndical at workplace or organization-level.  When treated as exogenous the 
presence of a union delegate is significantly associated with poorer workplace performance. 
However, once we account for potential endogeneity it switches sign and becomes 
statistically non-significant.
8 As anticipated, the selection process operates in the opposite 
direction to the British case: the negative rho in the bottom row of Table 4 for France 
indicates that the negative correlation between union delegates and workplace performance is 
driven by correlations in the unobservables influencing both union presence and poor 
performance, as might be the case where poor working conditions trigger worker desire for 
union representation.  
 
A further concern is that the results may be biased by the use of the subjective evaluation of 
performance. For WERS (but not REPONSE), we have accounting-type data on workplace 
profitability from the Financial Performance Questionnaire (FPQ) and linked data from the 
Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). Focusing on the sub-sample with data on the subjective and 
accounting measures – so that we can directly assess the impact of switching the performance 
measure without interference from changes in the estimation sample - reduces the sample to 
only 182 cases. This is a small sample, but the pattern of results across the subjective and 
accounting measures is broadly the same, i.e. a negative impact of unions (albeit on that is on 
the borderline of statistical significance). The estimated marginal effect of collective 
bargaining on the accounting measure of profits is around -5% (although not statistically 
significant). As a further check against common-rater bias in the subjective evaluation, we 
introduced an additional dummy variable into the WERS models presented in Table 4, 
identifying workplaces in which managers agreed with the statement that ‘unions help find 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
collective bargaining (the coefficients in the probit regression of collective bargaining were 0.751 (p<0.001) and 
0.390 (p=0.022) respectively) but neither characteristic was associated with workplace performance after 
controlling for other factors. Full details of the models are available on request.  
8 As anticipated, belonging to an organization with under 50 employees was positively associated with the 
likelihood that unions had collective bargaining rights at the workplace (the coefficient in the probit regression 
of bargaining rights was -1.863 (p<0.001)) but  it was not associated with workplace performance after 
controlling for other factors.    13
ways to improve workplace performance’ (again, this data was unavailable in REPONSE). 
The results shown in Table 4 were substantively unchanged.  
 
To summarise the analysis thus far, we have found support for our hypothesis that unions 
negatively affect firm financial performance in Britain, with the analysis indicating a negative 
effect arising from active union bargaining. However, the analysis thus far does not support 
our hypothesis that unions also negatively affect firm performance in France, since the 
negative association between union bargaining rights and firm performance in France 
disappears once endogenous selection into unionization is taken into account.  
 
We now turn to our alternative union indicator - membership density – in order to examine 
whether this measure of union strength exhibits similar relationships with workplace 
performance. We utilize a categorical variable in order to be able to retain those cases which 
have missing data on union membership density for the surveyed workplace; these are more 
numerous in the French data (194 cases, compared with just 14 in the British data). The 
French data also provide no disaggregation of the category of workplaces with membership 
density of 20 per cent or more: a level of density which is reasonably high for France but still 
relatively low for Britain. Accordingly, Model 1 of Table 5 uses the most comparable 
variables possible for the two countries, whilst Model 2 goes on to disaggregate higher-
density workplaces in Britain.   
 
TABLE 5 
Union density effects on financial performance by country 
 
  GB GB  France  France 
Model 1        
Union density (ref: 0%)        
1-19% -0.251       
20%+ -0.332*       
Some but % not known  -0.858**       
Union density (ref: 0-5%)      
5-19%     -0.062   
20%+     -0.528***   
Missing     -0.244*   
        
Model 2:        
Union density (ref: 0%)        
1-19% -0.258       
20-59% -0.270       
60%+ -0.502**       
Some but % not known  -0.885**       
 
Model 3: 
Union density  
1%+ (ref. None)  -0.313**  -1.040**     
20%+ (ref.<20%)
a     -0.500***  -1.750*** 









Rho   0.475*    0.711*** 
a: missing values excluded 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Full specifications for the models are available from the authors. 
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We find that in Britain having any union members is associated with lower financial 
performance than having none (Table 5, Model 1).  There is some indication that the effect 
may rise with higher density (Model 2), as we had hypothesized, but the coefficient for 
workplaces with membership density of 60% or more is not statistically significant from the 
coefficient for workplaces with density of 20-59%. This might indicate that, in an 
environment in which employers have become increasingly reluctant to afford unions a role 
in workplace governance, union density now serves as a poorer proxy for union bargaining 
power and influence than it did in the past. In France a somewhat different pattern emerges: 
those with low density (<20%) enjoy similar financial performance to workplaces with no 
union members, whereas those with high density (20%+) have significantly lower 
performance than no-member and low density workplaces. In both countries, the negative 
effect of union density becomes more pronounced when we treat union density as 
endogenous using the instruments described earlier.
9  
 
A possible reason for this unexpected link between high union density and poor workplace 
performance in France is that French workers are only motivated to join unions in large 
numbers in workplaces where their additional bargaining power allows them to share in the 
firm’s rents.  The positive and highly significant rho in the final column of Table 5 is 
consistent with this hypothesis since it indicates that features of the workplace that are 
unobservable to us generate higher workplace performance and increase workers’ propensity 
to join the union.  Recall that the selection effect determining the presence of a union 
delegate worked in the other direction (the rho in the last column of Table 4 is negative and 
significant), suggesting union delegates were present in workplaces that, for reasons we do 
not observe, also had lower financial performance than other workplaces.   
 
If one compares the IV estimates for the presence of union delegates and union density in 
France, one finds no significant effect of delegates but a negative effect of union density. 
These results can be reconciled when one recalls that union delegates are present in 52% of 
private sector workplaces in France whereas only 7% have union density of 20% or more.  
Thus the union delegate effect averages union effects for both strong and weak unions 
whereas the union density effect is capturing the impact of unions with strong bargaining 
power.  
 
This discussion clearly indicates that bargaining and density are not independent. However, 
the interaction differs between the two countries. In Britain, union membership is more 
prevalent than union bargaining. It thus seems reasonable to expect that the negative effect of 
union density is found only in the presence of active bargaining. Further analysis indicated 
this to be the case (Table 6, column 1). Conversely in France, as the previous paragraph 
indicates, bargaining is more prevalent than high density, and so it might be reasonable to 
expect that high density is the key determinant of union’s negative performance effect, and 
this too proves to be the case (Table 6, column 2). In essence, active bargaining is the 
dominant factor in Britain whilst high membership is the dominant factor in France.   
 
                                                           
9 Once again, the instruments performed well.  In the British case, the variable indicting the presence of workers 
aged 16-17 was negative and statistically significant (p<0.01) when estimating the probability of having any 
union members whilst the variables identifying workplaces with more than 50% female employees and 
workplaces located in the north of Britain were both positive and statistically significant (p<0.001 and p=0.015 
repectively). In the French case, the variables indicating the presence of young female workers and male craft 
workers were both negative and statistically significant when estimating the probability of having union density 
of at least 20% (p=0.001 and p=0.026 respectively). None of the instruments were associated with performance 
after controlling for other factors.    15
TABLE 6 
Union bargaining and density effects on financial performance by country 
 
  GB France 
Ref: no union members    
Union members but no active 
bargaining  -0.223  
Union members with active 
bargaining  -0.452**  
    
Ref: no bargaining rights    
Bargaining rights but density 
< 20%   -0.173* 
Bargaining rights and density 
>= 20%   -0.574*** 
 
 
Finally we turn to the heterogeneity of unions in the two countries.  In France, each 
confederation has its own strong political and/or religious tradition which may influence its 
attitude to workplace employment relations and pay bargaining.  Table 7 (column 2) indicates 
that this is indeed the case since the negative effect of unions on workplace performance is 
confined to the Communist CGT and revolutionary SUD. There is no real parallel in the 
British case.  Indeed, it is likely that there is more within-union variance in orientations 
towards employers than there is across-union variance. This hypothesis is supported by the 
fact that there is a degree of homogeneity across the five most prevalent unions in Britain 




Effects of Different Unions in France 
  GB France 
(Ref: No active bargaining)     
TGWU (General)   -0.272    
UNIFI (Finance sector)   -0.331    
USDAW (Retail sector)   -0.384    
Amicus (General)   -0.166    
GMB (General)   -0.463    
Other   -0.444**    
    
(Ref. No bargaining rights)    
Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT)(reformist)    0.003 
Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) (communist)    -0.207* 
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC) (reformist)    0.039 
Force Ouvrière (CGT-FO)(Communist/Trotskyist : reformist)   -0.030 
 Confédération Générale des Cadres (CGC) (white collar executives)    0.161 
Solidaires, Unitaires, Démocratiques (SUD) (revolutionary)    -0.763*** 
Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes (UNSA) (reformist)    -0.055 
Other unions    0.041 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Full specifications for the models are available from the authors. 
 
 
                                                           
10 One should note that some of the British unions cited in Table 7 suffer from small cell sizes (see Table 2). 
There are no such concerns in the regression for France.      16
6.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper tests the proposition that union effects on workplace financial performance vary 
with the institutional arrangements governing employment relations. We investigate union 
effects on workplace performance in Britain and France using nationally representative data 
for workplaces with 20 or more employees. In both countries unionization is associated with 
poorer workplace performance.   
 
We anticipated that this effect was associated with collective bargaining. Clear evidence of 
this emerges for Britain since the effect is absent where unions are not actively engaged in 
collective bargaining.  Furthermore, these effects are underestimated if collective bargaining 
is treated as exogenous. In France, there is no such association between union bargaining and 
workplace performance once the endogeneity of union bargaining is taken into account.  
 
We hypothesized that in Britain unions’ negative association with financial performance 
would rise with union density because density proxies union bargaining strength and thus 
their ability to achieve their bargaining ends. However, we suspected that institutional 
arrangements in France would limit the impact of union density. In fact, union density in 
France performed much as we had anticipated union density would perform in Britain. That 
is to say, high union density is associated with poorer financial performance in French 
workplaces.  One possible reason for this is that French workers only become union members 
in workplaces with high rents to share, a proposition supported by our instrumental variables 
estimates showing a positive correlation in the unobservables determining workplace 
performance and higher union density. In the British case, although having any union 
members was clearly associated with lower financial performance than having none, there 
was only tentative evidence that high union density was associated with lower performance 
than lower density. In summary, active bargaining was the dominant factor in Britain whilst 
high membership was the dominant factor in France. 
 
We also explored the heterogeneity of unions in the two countries.  In France, unions’ 
negative effects on workplace performance were confined to the Communist CGT and 
revolutionary SUD. In the Britain, there appears to be a greater degree of homogeneity, due 
perhaps to the absence of strong political traditions equivalent to those seen in France.  
 
The policy environment in France has recently moved towards a situation in which, as a 
result of the Loi Fillon, the award of bargaining rights is now more conditional upon unions 
having support among the workforce at an establishment. In this sense, France is moving 
(albeit very gradually) in the direction of more voluntarist Britain. The results presented here 
suggest that such moves will not necessarily ameloriate any negative effects of unionization 
on firm performance. 
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Appendix Table A1: Definitions of variables  
   GB France 





Dependent variable:        
Workplace financial   A lot better than average  0.13  114  0.02  49 
Performance  Better than average  0.47  375  0.28  500 
  About average for industry  0.33  299  0.53  872 
  Below  average  0.06 69 0.15  312 
  A lot below average  0.01  6  0.02  42 
Union indicators: 
 
See Table 2      
Independent variables:      
Structural characteristics:      
Establishment  size:      
20-49 0.67  247  0.53  352 
50-99 0.19  165  0.23  255 
100-199 0.08  140  0.13  340 
200-499 0.04  153  0.08  336 
500+ 0.01  158  0.03  505 
Foreign  ownership      
Foreign owned  0.13  187  0.11  319 
DK     0.02  47 
Industry:      
Manufacturing 0.17  202  0.29  688 
Electricity, gas and water  0.01  29  0.02  52 
Construction  0.07 53 0.11  142 
Wholesale and retail  0.28  165  0.22  334 
Transport and communications  0.06  75  0.06  84 
Financial  services  0.04 68 0.04 96 
Other business services  0.14  127  0.17  281 
Education & Health  0.08  52  0.02  50 
Hotels and restaurants & Other business services  0.16  92  0.06  61 
Franchise  0.04 26 0.02 23 
Workforce characteristics:      
Largest occupational group:         
Lower-skilled workers  0.50 419 0.51 882 
Administrative 0.15  118  0.31  468 
Professional and technical  0.05  66  0.07  176 
Sales 0.22  186  0.01  22 
Senior managers and Skilled trades 0.08  74 0.10  240 
Percentage of employees on 
fixed-term contracts: 
    
None/1-9% 0.91  778  0.86  1539 
10%  or  more  0.09 85 0.12  225 
DK     0.02  24 
Introduced new technology in 
past 2 years (Fr 3 years) 
0.50 519 0.14 305 
Introduced new product/service 
in past 2 years (Fr 3 years) 
0.32 374 0.39 777 
Sets targets for profits  0.69  651  0.81  1,504 
Sets targets for sales  0.77  708  0.69  1,241 
Sets targets for quality  0.51 541 0.83 1,581 
Market characteristics:      
Location  of  market:      
Local 0.36  232  0.23  322 
Regional 0.22  127  0.25  307 
National 0.29  295  0.27  423 
International 0.14  209  0.25  748 
DK      
State  of  market:      
Growing 0.51  408  0.56  996 
Mature 0.23  208  0.28  481 
Declining  0.08 69 0.14  303 
Turbulent 0.18  178  -  - 
DK     0.02  8 
Continued on next page 
Table A1 continued 
 
   GB France 




Sample   21
Market  share      
Less than 5%  0.44  237  0.19  247 
5-10% 0.11  102  0.34  635 
11-50% 0.25  303  0.30  601 
More than 50%  0.08  96  0.17  305 
DK 0.13  125     
      
Price elasticity of demand           
  Demand does not depend on price  0.26  191  0.27  446 
  Demand depend partially on price  0.30  255  0.38  665 
  Demand depend heavily on price  0.44  417  0.33  641 
 DK/Missing      0.02  36 
HR practices        
Performance-related pay or 
bonuses for managers or non-
managers 
 0.48  485  0.88  1,652 
Profit-related pay    0.45  428  0.48  1,104 
Share options    0.09  126  0.05  209 
Quality circles    0.25 327 0.50 1,055 
Briefing groups    0.76  731  0.80  1,543 
Suggestion scheme    0.33  341  0.25  544 
Appraisals for managers    0.75  725  0.79  1,572 
Appraisals for non-managers    0.76  704  0.76  1,487 
Survey of employees    0.43  492  0.18  487 
Autonomous Work Team            
  none 0.58  532  0.13  258 
  GB: 60%+ / Fr 50%+  0.33  266  0.06  136 
  GB: 20-59% / Fr 20-49%  0.08  49  0.23  458 
  1-19%  0.01 16 0.58  936 
Job  Rotation        
  none 0.87  768  0.48  843 
  GB: 60%+ / Fr Yes  0.13  95  0.51  936 
  Missing     0.01  9 
Job  Control        
 Occasional  0.81 736 0.32 645 
  GB: A lot / Fr: Permanent Job control  0.19  27  0.68  1,143 
 Missing  -       
Changed working time in last 2 
years (Fr 3 years) 
 0.27  339  0.22  305 
Changed work organisation in 
last 2 years (Fr 3 years) 
 0.37  463  0.30  670 
Sets targets for labour costs    0.47  472  0.17  285 
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Appendix Table A2.Baseline Models of Financial Performance – detailed results 
 GB  FRANCE 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
         
Collective Bargaining  Rights (ref. no bargaining 
rights) 
-0.055 -0.212  -0.224  -0.153*  -0.173*  -0.221** 
Workplace size (ref. is 20-49 employees)           
50-99 employees   0.029  0.102    0.177*  0.175* 
100-199 employees   0.148  0.256    -0.066  -0.089 
200-499 employees   -0.208  -0.114    0.091  0.042 
500 or more employees    0.072 0.117   0.167 0.085 
Foreign owned (ref. domestically-owned)   -0.243  -0.206    0.018  -0.041 
DK/NA         0.265  0.143 
Industrial activity (ref. is manufacturing)           
Electricity, gas and water    0.451* 0.521    -0.182 -0.240 
Construction    0.050 0.065   0.290**  0.253* 
Wholesale and retail    0.081 0.063   0.217 0.248* 
Transport and communications    0.120 0.111   0.233 0.244 
Financial services    0.602** 0.576**   0.298  0.332 
Other business services    0.240 0.262   0.388***  0.364*** 
Education & Health    0.004 0.087   0.169 0.226 
Hotels and restaurants & Other services    0.305 0.305   -0.079  -0.012 
Franchise (ref. not a franchise)   -0.392  -0.415    0.405  0.322 
Largest occupational group (ref. is blue collar)           
Lower grade white collar    -0.058  -0.119    0.041  0.036 
Technician/supervisor    0.035  -0.044   -0.147 -0.162 
Sales    0.045 0.042   0.433 0.337 
Executives    -0.187 -0.230   -0.104 -0.202 
Percentage of employees fixed-term contract (ref. is 
none/1-9%)           
10% or more    0.343** 0.347*    -0.148  -0.166 
DK       0.030  0.040 
Introduced new technology in past 2 years (Fr 3 
years)    0.100 0.131   0.108 0.120 
Introduced new product/service in past 2 years (Fr 3 
years)    0.078 0.096   -0.006  -0.006 
Sets targets for profits    -0.084 -0.037   -0.102 -0.168 
Sets targets for sales    -0.096 -0.067   -0.184*  -0.200** 
Sets targets for quality    0.198  0.239*   0.229* 0.173 
Location of the market (ref. is local)          
Regional    0.167 0.203   -0.084  -0.065 
National/international    0.145 0.101   0.175 0.196 
DK         
Product market state (ref. is growing)         
Mature   -0.397*** -0.461***   -0.047  -0.034 
Declining   -0.172 -0.206   -0.509***  -0.493*** 
Turbulent   -0.541*** -0.592***   1.238*** 1.239*** 
Missing         
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Table A2 continued 
 
 GB  FRANCE 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Market share (ref. is less than 5 per cent)         
5-25 per cent    0.147 0.183   0.039 0.007 
More than 26 per cent    0.214 0.256   0.174 0.172 
DK/Missing   -0.099 -0.051   0.155 0.152 
Price elasticity of demand (ref. is depend partially 
on price)         
Demand does not depend on price    0.016 0.015   0.386***  0.414*** 
Demand depend heavily on price    -0.152 -0.144   -0.177*  -0.175* 
DK/Missing      -0.038  -0.050 
HR practices (ref. is none)         
Performance-related pay or bonuses for managers 
or non-managers     0.007    0.208 
Profit-related pay     0.012    0.081 
Share options     0.156    0.173 
Quality circles     0.111    0.210** 
Briefing groups     -0.267**    -0.141 
Suggestion scheme     0.001    -0.178* 
Appraisals for managers     0.056    -0.183 
Appraisals for non-managers     0.136    0.173 
Survey of employees     0.039    0.225** 
Autonomous Work Team (ref. is none)         
GB: 60%+ / Fr 50%+      -0.093     -0.201 
GB: 20-59% / Fr 20-49%      0.210     -0.100 
1-19%     -1.073***     -0.162 
Job Rotation (ref. is none)         
GB: 60%+ / Fr Yes      -0.085     0.095 
Missing        1.306*** 
Job Control(ref. is occasional)         
GB: A lot / Fr: Permanent Job control      0.228     0.122 
Changed working time in last 2 years  
(Fr 3 years)     0.075     -0.174* 
Changed work organisation in last 2 years (Fr 3 
years)     -0.282**     0.094 
Sets targets for labour costs      -0.111     -0.056 
        
Pseudo-R
2  0.002  0.058 0.079 0.003 0.060 0.080 
Number of observations  863  863  863  1,788  1,788  1,788 
Notes: *  significant at 10 per cent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 1 per cent level. DK/NA refers to ‘Don’t 
know/ Not answered’ as a response.  
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